Support the Troops

The Problem

The war currently being fought in Iraq is just one front in the global conflict between the Islamist movement and the Free World. The former Iraqi regime was - like the Taliban regime in Afghanistan - an active sponsor of terrorist groups and agents. Iraq was sheltering and supporting (among other terrorists) a principal terrorist behind the current insurgency, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

The historic first steps toward democratic government in the Middle East, in Afghanistan and Iraq, have already had enormous psychological and political impact throughout the region, prompting democratic concessions on the part of some unelected governments, and giving hope and inspiration to reformers in many countries in the Middle East and beyond.

To lose these pivotal struggles would be to set back the cause of the Free World, perhaps irreparably in some regions - and would establish new centers of enemy activity.

Terrorists - like a malignancy - must be eliminated. They cannot be appeased with concessions or legitimated with a diplomatic band-aid. Not only is it a grave mistake to try to co-opt terrorists. The mere act of negotiating with them can prove to dangerous when diplomacy is used as a tactic to buy time and prepare for new offensives against the Free World.

The key aims of the terrorists in Iraq are to obscure any evidence of progress, and to escalate the costs of securing the new Iraq. The terrorist campaign is designed to lend support to those American voices that demand that we pull out our troops.

An arbitrary deadline for withdrawal would simply encourage the terrorists to bide their time, until they no longer face US troops. It would demoralize and probably alienate our allies, both in Iraq and beyond; it would embolden our enemies; and it would provide further incentives for the killing of Americans and other freedom-loving people in the interest of accelerating our surrender.

What Needs to Be Done

1. Win in Iraq.

• Maintain military priorities and current troop strength to: deny the insurgents safe-haven and isolate the insurgents from the surrounding population.



• Be a reliable ally. Make no further concessions to Baathists or other insurgents, and restore the confidence of the Iraqi people in the US commitment to their security and freedom. Reject any timetable or deadline for US forces to withdraw, in favor of a jointly developed goal-driven transition plan.



• Develop the Iraqi Security Forces. By the fall of 2006, the Iraqi Army, National Guard, police, and other security forces will number 250,000 courageous men and women. These forces need: training in military skills, training in professional ethics and civilian relations, armored fighting vehicles, artillery and mortars, helicopters, communications, as well as logistics and maintenance capabilities.

2. Stay on the Offensive. We need to be mindful that, if we fail to keep our enemies off balance and on the run, we risk having to fight them some day within our national borders. If non-military strategies are insufficient, military options are called for.

3. Transform the Military. Maintain the armed forces we need today - and prepare for the needs of tomorrow:

• Meet the costs associated with the war effort.



• Ensure that we sustain our armed forces' technological edge.



• Continue to field the most professional and best-trained forces in the world.



• Maintain the ability to project power rapidly and globally. Toward this end, defense spending should be increased: to 4% of GDP in Fiscal Year 2006, 4.5% in Fiscal Year 2007, and 5% in Fiscal Year 2008.

4. Target the leaders of terrorist organizations. To do this, we need to create dedicated combined-arms units, equipped with:

• elite conventional ground combat elements
• dedicated intelligence assets



• unmanned aerial vehicles



• mobility capabilities

5. Fashion new alliances. The United States must aggressively pursue the creation of new alliances designed to support the long-term global war on terrorism, including:

• Arrangements that are less formal than the NATO model, yet more durable than the ad hoc coalitions created to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq



• Long-term relationships that will support intelligence-sharing, training, and multinational operations

5. Recognize the limits of diplomacy. In general, it is surely better to discuss differences than to fight over them. However, when the real choice is between fighting a weak enemy today or a stronger enemy tomorrow, the diplomatic process may be a dangerous illusion.

6. Provide quality intelligence. To do this, critical changes must be made:

• Encourage more risk-taking and competitive analysis. Eliminate pressures on analysts to produce conforming reports.



• Make personnel changes. Careerists should be replaced with professionals capable of thinking outside the box - in both the CIA and DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency).



• Bring intelligence professionalism into the State Department.



• Liberate US intelligence collection. Bureaucratic problems inhibit our ability to gather crucial information and to transmit it quickly to policy-makers or to commanders in the field.



• Undo recent detrimental "reforms." Recent changes created an additional, dysfunctional layer of bureaucracy - the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) whose personnel decisions and organizational demands have exacerbated problems within the community, not alleviated them.

Contributors: Major General Paul Vallely USA (Ret.), Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney USAF (Ret.) and Dr. Dan Goure and Dr. Michael Rubin